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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 20090417
ROGER HOWARD STEELE,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the court of appeals by
provision of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
a. Issue: Was the cooperative wildlife management unit permit issued to
the defendant void ab initio?
Standard of review: Questions of law are reviewed for correctness
without deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. State v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d 146
(UtahApp. 1996).
b. Issue: Was the mistake-of-law instruction likely to have confused the
issues and to have misled the jury?

Standard of review: An appellate court reviews the adequacy of jury
instructions de novo, evaluating the instruction in question in the context of the
instructions as a whole. See State v. Pirtle, 111 Wn.2d 628, 656, 904 P.2d 245 (1995).
c. Issue: Was the defendant denied the right to a speedy trial?
Standard of review: The appellate court reviews a trial court's
determinations on speedy trial issues for abuse of discretion. State v. Coleman, 2001 UT
App 281, p , 34 P.3d 790, cert, denied, 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The texts of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 23-20-4(1) and 23-19-5 (2003) and the
text of LAWS OF UTAH 2007, Ch. 136, § 3, amending UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-19-5.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. This appeal is from a final judgment and order of the Sixth Judicial
District Court, in and for Kane County, Honorable Marvin D. Bagley presiding. The
appeal is taken from a judgment of conviction, sentence, and order of probation.

Proceedings in the Lower Court. Defendant Roger Howard Steel was charged with
WANTON DESTRUCTION OF PROTECTED WILDLIFE, a 3rd degree felony;
FRAUD, DECEIT, OR MISREPRESENTATION IN OBTAINING A LICENSE,
PERMIT, TAG, OR CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION, a class B misdemeanor (2
counts); and FAILURE TO WEAR HUNTER ORANGE, a class B misdemeanor. The
misdemeanor offenses were dismissed on Defendant's motion on the grounds that they

were barred by operation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-l-302(l)(b). Defendant was tried
and convicted of the charge of WANTON DESTRUCTION OF PROTECTED
WILDLIFE, a 3rd degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-20-4 (2003).

Disposition in the Trial Court. The defendant was sentenced to a term of 0 to 5 years
in the Utah State Prison. The execution of the prison term was stayed and defendant was
placed on unsupervised probation, subject to certain terms and conditions.

Statement of Facts. In 2003, the defendant applied for and was issued a cooperative
wildlife management unit permit (CWMU permit) for the taking of a male mule deer on
the Alton Cooperative Wildlife Management Unit in Kane County. State's Exhibit No.
2; R 153, at 41. In applying for the permit, the defendant identified himself as a resident
of the State of Utah. State's Exhibit No. 2. On September 5, 2003, the defendant shot,
killed, and tagged a male mule deer in the Alton Unit using the CWMU permit in
question. R 152, at 25-27; R 153, at 56-57.
In 2003, the defendant was charged with WANTON DESTRUCTION OF
PROTECTED WILDLIFE, a 3rd degree felony; FRAUD, DECEIT, OR
MISREPRESENTATION IN OBTAINING A LICENSE, PERMIT, TAG, OR
CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION, a class B misdemeanor (2 counts); and
FAILURE TO WEAR HUNTER. ORANGE, class B misdemeanor, in a case styled State
of Utah v. Steele, Kane County Case No. 031600115. Attorney Jim R. Scarth
represented the defendant in those proceedings. R 9-11; 33-38.

The 2003 proceedings were dismissed on January 30, 2007, on the State's
motion. The motion stated that the dismissal was sought "due to lack of evidence to
prosecute." R 34. Actually, the State had sought the dismissal because Kane County had
offered the defendant's attorney, Jim Scarth, a position in the county attorney's office. R
37, 22-24. The State then, acting through a special prosecutor, refiled these charges in
the instant proceedings on March 28, 2007. R 1-2.
The defendant, acting through new counsel, moved the district court to
dismiss the misdemeanor charges on the grounds that they were now barred by operation
of the statute of limitations. R 9-11; 28-30. The defendant also moved the court to
dismiss the felony charge on the grounds that that charge could not be prosecuted
without violating the defendant's right to a speedy trial. R 9-11. The district court
dismissed the misdemeanor charges, but denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the
felony charge. R 33-39.
A preliminary hearing was conducted on January 25, 2008. R 45-46. The
State contended that the defendant had committed a misdemeanor violation of UTAH
CODE ANN. § 23-19-5 (2003) by fraudulently representing himself to be a Utah resident
in procuring the CWMU permit in question, that the permit was therefore void ah initio,
that consequently the animal in question was taken without a permit and that the
defendant was therefore guilty of a felony violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-20-4
(2003).
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No evidence presented suggested that the defendant had purchased a
resident license for hunting, fishing, or trapping in any other state or country, nor was
any evidence presented which indicated that the Division of Wildlife Resources
(hereinafter "the division") had taken any agency action for the purpose of revoking or
suspending the permit in question.
The defendant was bound over for trial and moved to have the bindover
order quashed arguing that, as a matter of law, the CWMU permit in question was not
void ah initio and that the permit was valid unless and until the division took action to
revoke the same. R 50-57. The defendant further argued that, under the statutory
scheme existing in 2003, the only way in which the permit could have been automatically
invalidated was if the defendant had purchased a resident license for hunting, fishing, or
trapping in any other state or country. R 53.
Defendant's motion to quash was denied and the case was tried to a jury. R
75-80.
At trial, the defendant defended on the theory that even if he did not qualify
as a Utah resident at the time that he applied for and acquired the CWMU permit in
question, he reasonably believed that he did so qualify and that he therefore did not
possess the requisite blameworthy state of mind to commit the felony offense. In support
of this theory, the defendant developed evidence establishing the following:
The defendant was raised in Payson, Utah. R 153, at 26-27. After he grew
up and got married he moved to California where he worked in the aerospace industiy. R

153, at 27. He continued to hunt deer in Utah and until 2002 he hunted here as a
nonresident. R 153, at 40.
Defendant and his first wife divorced and in November 2001 he married a
girl he had dated in high school. R 152, at 102, 110; R 153, at 29-30. Her name was
Kerry Lyn Fannin. Kerry Lyn was a resident of Utah County. She was enrolled in the
University of Phoenix and attending classes in Utah County. R 152, at 111; R 153, at 2932. She continued attending classes in Utah after she and the defendant married. R 152,
at 111-112; R 153, at 31-33. She and the defendant rented a house in California and the
defendant paid for Kerry Lyn to travel back and forth between California and Utah so
she could complete her studies. R 152, at 113; R 153, at 31-33. While attending classes,
she stayed at her parents' home in Utah County where she had lived for the three years
between the termination of her first marriage and her marriage to the defendant. R 152,
at98, 111.
During this time frame, the defendant was attempting to find work in
aerospace engineering in Utah. R 153, at 33-34. He was also keeping and training
domesticated animals in Utah County. R 153, at 39. According to Kerry Lyn, who had
since been divorced from the defendant and who appeared as a witness for the State, the
defendant was trying to find work in Utah so they could move back to Utah. R 152, at
114. She further testified that when the defendant was making application for the
CWMU permit in question, she and the defendant had had a conversation in which he
asked her if she thought it would be okay if he used her parents' address on the

application. R 152, at 115. She apparently did not see any problem with using the Utah
County address. R 152, at 115.
In filling out the application in question, the defendant disclosed the fact
that he had a California driver license and included the driver license number. R 153, at
41-43. However, he used his in-laws' Utah County address as his own. R 153, at 43.
When the defendant came up to Utah to meet with Wade Heaton, the
manager of the Alton Cooperative Wildlife Management Unit, he drove a vehicle with
California plates. R 153, at 52-53. When he came up for the hunt he was in a truck with
California plates. R 153, at 54-55. When he discussed his employment with other
members of the hunting party, he did not attempt to mislead anybody about his
employment or living arrangements. R 153, at 55-56.
The State countered this theory of defense with a jury instruction by which
the court advised the jurors that mistake of law was no defense. R 153, at 87-90. The
defendant objected to this instruction on the grounds that it did not have any application
to the facts of the case because the defendant was not claiming that he was unaware of
the existence or meaning of a penal law. R 153, at 87-89. Rather, it was the defendant's
contention that, relying on his interpretation of non-penal statutes, he had, in good faith,
concluded that he qualified as a Utah resident for the purpose of acquiring a hunting
license. The defendant further contended that the instruction would lead the jury to
believe that even if the defendant had, in good faith, concluded that he qualified as a
Utah resident, this was a "mistake of law" for which there is no excuse and that the
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defendant could be found guilty if the jury concluded that he did not qualify as a resident.
R 153, at 87-89. The district court gave the mistake-of-law instruction over the
defendant's objection.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty, sentence was imposed, and this appeal
followed. R 153, at 117, R 144-150.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under the statutory scheme in force at the time of the alleged offense, a
person who acquired a license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration by
misrepresentation could be punished as a misdemeanant under Section 23-19-5 (2003).
However, a license or permit so obtained was not void ab initio and the licensee who
used the license could not be punished for a violation of Section 23-20-4 (2003) as
though he had acted without the benefit of license.
The district court erred in giving an instruction that, in substance and
effect, advised the jury that the defendant could be held strictly liable even if he had, in
good faith, mistakenly concluded that he qualified as a Utah resident.
Finally, the defendant was denied a speedy trial by the dismissal and
reinstatement of the felony charge where the State has failed to articulate a legitimate
reason for dismissing and then reinstating the charge.

o

ARGUMENT
POINT I
EVEN IF THE CWMU PERMIT IN QUESTION WAS
VOIDABLE, IT WAS NOT VOID AB INITIO.
The State's theory of criminal liability is based upon the argument that the
defendant did not have a permit at the time the defendant took the animal in question.
Because the State concedes that the Division of Wildlife Resources issued the defendant
a CWMU permit for the taking of a male mule deer on the Alton Cooperative Wildlife
Management Unit and further concedes that the division took no action to revoke the
Defendant's permit, the State argues that the CWMU permit was void ab initio because it
was allegedly procured by fraud.
This case does not turn upon a question of statutory construction. The
language of the relevant statutes does not contain any ambiguity requiring application of
the well-established rules of construction and interpretation. The question presented here
is not one of what the statutes mean, but is an issue of whether or not a permit procured
in violation of statute is, by operation of general principles of law, void ab initio or
merely voidable.

Common Law Principles Regarding Voiding Rights Procured by Fraud. Under
principles of the common law, a legal right or interest that is obtained by fraud or
misrepresentation may be voided at the election of the party upon whom the fraud is
practiced. In other words, such a legal right or interest is said to be "voidable." See
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Continental Insurance Co. v. Kingston, supra (benefits payable under policy of casualty
insurance) and Bennion Ins. Co. v. 1st OK Corp., 571 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1977) (interest in
real property).
In Continental Insurance Co. v. Kingston, supra, Kingston's insurance
policy application stated that the home for which insurance was sought had been
constructed in 1990. The structure had actually been built in the 1800s. Three years
after the policy was issued, the home was substantially damaged by fire. The insurer
examined Kingston under oath as part of its claims investigation. Around this time, the
insurer examined Kingston's insurance application and discovered that it identified 1990
as the year of construction. As a result, the insurer filed a complaint seeking a court
order rescinding the insurance policy on the grounds that Kingston had made material
misrepresentations on the application. The Utah Court of Appeals concluded that:
A contract containing material misrepresentations is voidable
at the election of the injured party. Thus, any material
misrepresentations made on Kingston's insurance policy
application rendered the policy voidable instead of void ab
initio.
2005 UT App 233, f21, 114 P.3d at 1164.
The court went on to conclude, after discussing legal principles that are not
relevant here, that the insurer's course of conduct after the loss established that
Continental had intentionally relinquished its right to rescind the contract.
In Bennion Ins. Co. v. 1st OK Corp., supra, the Utah Supreme Court held
that the deceit practiced in misrepresenting the number of acres described in the deed in
question was fraud in the inducement and not fraud in factum. The grantors knew they
in

were executing a deed for the conveyance of real property, but were deceived concerning
the acreage described in the instrument. Because the fraud was in the inducement, and
not fraud in factum, the deed was not void ab initio.
There is no general principle of common law that would render the C WMU
permit in question void ab initio even if the defendant intentionally misrepresented his
residency in procuring the permit. The division's agent was certainly aware of the fact
that s/he was issuing a hunting permit. There was no fraud in factum, and therefore the
permit was not void ab initio. If there was any fraud here, it was fraud in the inducement
which may have rendered the permit voidable.

Impact of Statutory Scheme on Validity of License Procured by Fraud. In People v.
Sharp, 26 111. App.3d 1051, 326 N.E.2d 213 (Dist. 4 1975), the defendant was convicted
of burglary and, because he had used a motor vehicle in the commission of that offense,
the Secretary of State had issued an order revoking his driver's license. Four years later
the defendant procured a driver's license under a different name. On the application for
the new license, the defendant denied that his license had ever been revoked. The
following year, the Secretary of State cancelled the new license. The defendant was
charged with and convicted of three counts of driving on revocation. These offenses
were allegedly committed after the defendant had procured the new license and before it
was canceled by the Secretary of State. The issue on appeal turned on "the question of
the validity of a license obtained upon the basis of misinformation and whether such
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license would be void from the date of issuance." 26 111. App.3d at 1054. In reversing
the defendant's convictions, the Illinois appellate court observed:
We find no language in the statutes that in any way indicates
that a license obtained under circumstances such as revealed
by this record to be void ab initio as is contended by the
State. On the contrary, the statutory scheme permits of
cancellation or revocation for cause and included in the
statutory cause for cancellation is that the applicant failed to
give the required or correct information in his application.
Id. (citations omitted). The court went on to note that if the State could prove that the
defendant knowingly acted fraudulently in his application, he could be prosecuted for
that offense. Id.
Upon further review, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed. See People v.
Turner, 64 I11.2d 183 ,354 N.E.2d 897 (1976). The state supreme court's decision was
not based upon some general principle of law that purportedly rendered a license
procured by misrepresentation void ab initio. Its decision was based upon a state statute
that expressly prohibited the Secretary of State from issuing a license to any person
whose license had been revoked except in accordance with a specific statutory provision.
That statute provided that before the Secretary of State could issue a license to someone
whose privilege had been previously revoked, the Secretary had to be "satisfied after
investigation of such person that to grant the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the
highways will not endanger the public safety or welfare." 64 I11.2d at 186 (citations
omitted). The court went on to conclude:
The legislature has established through section 6-208 the
procedure to have driving privileges restored. It calls for the
disclosure of the revocation or other action taken against the
1?

applicant and then provides that the Secretary shall not issue
a license until he has investigated the applicant and
determined that to grant the privilege of driving on the
highways will not endanger the public safety or welfare.
The Secretary of State had revoked the defendant's license,
and it could be restored only upon compliance with the
provisions of the statute.
M a t 186-187.

Utah Statutory Scheme in Force in 2003. In 2003, UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-19-5 read
as follows:
It is unlawful for any person to obtain or attempt to obtain a
license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration by fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation. It is unlawful for a nonresident
to purchase a resident license. It is unlawful for a resident to
purchase a nonresident license. Any person violating the
provisions of this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
Section 23-20-4(1) read as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of wanton destruction of protected
wildlife if that person:
(a) commits an act in violation of Section 23-13-4,
23-13-5, 23-13-13, 23-15-6 through 23-15-9, 23-16-5, or
Subsection 23-20-3(1);
(b) captures, injures, or destroys protected wildlife; and
(c) (i) does so with intentional, knowing, or reckless
conduct as defined in Section 76-2-103;
(ii) intentionally abandons protected wildlife or a carcass;
(iii) commits the offense at night with the use of a
weapon;
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(iv) is under a court or division revocation of a license,
tag, permit, or certificate of registration; or
(v) acts for pecuniary gain.
Under the statutory scheme in force at the time of the alleged offense, a
person who acquired a license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration by
misrepresentation could be punished as a misdemeanant under Section 23-19-5 (2003).
However, he could not be punished for a violation of Section 23-20-4 (2003) as though
he had acted without the benefit of license unless he "[wa]s under a court or division
revocation of [that] license, tag, permit, or certificate of registration." See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 23-20-4(l)(c)(iv).
If the Legislature had intended to provide one punishment for acquiring a
license or permit by misrepresentation and a separate punishment for using the license or
permit so obtained, it could have easily drafted the statutes to achieve this result.1
An examination of the relevant statutes in force in September 2003 clearly
indicates that there was only one statutory provision that operated to automatically render
a hunting license or permit invalid. By provision of UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-13-2(37)(e)
(2003), a Utah resident license was automatically rendered invalid if the holder of the

'Note that effective April 30,2007, House Bill 48 amended UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-19-5
to add Subsection (2) which states that a license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration
obtained by fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation is invalid. When Representative Richard
Wheeler, the sponsor of the above-mentioned legislation, addressed the Utah State House
of Representatives in support of the bill, he described the proposed legislation as closing two
"loop holes," one of which he described in the following language: "It's already unlawful
to obtain a license fraudulently but that license is still valid, so it also makes the license
invalid." Recording of House Floor Debates, 57th Legislature, General Session (Jan. 18,
2007) (http://www.hmge.le.state.ut.us/imaging/bill.asp?Page=6). Emphasis added.
i/i

license purchased a resident license for hunting, fishing, or trapping in any other state or
country.
Neither UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-13-2(37) (2003), which defined "resident,"
nor UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-19-5 (2003), which penalized the fraudulent acquisition of a
hunting license or permit, purported to render a license or permit procured in violation of
law void ab initio. Even if the Division of Wildlife Resources had grounds for revoking
the defendant's license or permit, the division was required to initiate agency action
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-19-9 (2003) before the defendant could have been denied
the privilege of exercising the benefits conferred by the license or permit in question.
Subsection 23-19-9(2), read in conjunction with Subsection 23-19-9(1), provides that a
hearing officer, appointed by the division, may suspend or revoke "the privilege of. . .
exercising the benefits conferred by a license or permit issued by the division" if the
licensee or permittee is convicted of or enters into a plea in abeyance or diversion
agreement involving a violation of Title 23 or a rule of the Wildlife Board, and the
hearing officer determines the licensee or permittee committed the offense intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly, as defined in Section 76-2-103.
Even if the CWMU permit in question was voidable on the grounds of
fraud or misrepresentation, it was not void ab initio, and the taking of the mule deer
under that license was not unlawful.
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POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY CONCERNING MISTAKE OF LAW.
At trial, the defendant defended on the theory that even if he did not qualify
as a Utah resident at the time that he applied for and acquired the CWMU permit in
question, he reasonably believed that he did so qualify and that he therefore did not
possess the requisite blameworthy state of mind to commit the felony offense. See pages
5-7, supra.
Over the defendant's objection, the district court, at the State's behest,
instructed the jury that mistake of law was no defense. Instruction No. 28A stated:
You are instructed that ignorance or mistake concerning the
existence or meaning of a penal law is no defense to a crime
unless:
(A) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably
believed his conduct did not constitute an offense, and
(B) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's
reasonable reliance upon:
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written
order or grant of permission by an administrative agency
charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in
question; or
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an
opinion of a court of record or made by a public servant
charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in
question.
Without question, this jury instruction accurately states the law. Indeed, it
is tracks the language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-304(2) verbatim. The problem with
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this instruction is that it confuses the issue that was central to the defendant's theory of
the case.
The only "ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a
penal law" to which the instruction could have had reference, given the facts in evidence,
was the defendant's contention that he reasonably believed that he qualified as a Utah
resident. The instruction suggests that even if the defendant reasonably believed that he
qualified as a Utah resident, he did so as a result of his "ignorance or mistake concerning
the existence or meaning of a penal law."
The defendant had not sought to defend on the theory that he should be
excused on the basis of his ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of
the penal law that made it illegal for a nonresident to procure a resident hunting permit.
His theory of defense was that he reasonably believed that, under the facts and
circumstances of his and his wife's living arrangements, he qualified as a Utah resident
when he applied for the CWMU permit in question.
The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to the
facts of the case. Encompassed in this duty is the right of the defendant to have his
theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way. State v.
Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981). The parties are "entitled to . . . a presentation of the
case to the jury under instructions that clearly, concisely and accurately state the issues
and the law applicable thereto so that the jury will understand its duties." Nielsen v.
Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830 P.2d 270, 274-75 (Utah 1992). Fulfilling this obligation may
require a court to tailor certain instructions to fit the facts of the case or to carefully
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explain to the jury how one instruction may or may not relate to another. Id. (explaining
that trial court's failure to simplify and clarify jury instructions resulted in confusing
instructions that "may well have prejudiced [appellant's] . . . case.") {quoting Hanks v.
Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564, 566 (I960)). If the instructions are so general
that they could have misled and confused the jury, the defendant is denied a fair trial.
Potter, 627 P.2d at 78.
In substance and effect, the instruction suggests that the defendant would
be strictly liable, even if he had, in good faith but, mistakenly concluded that he qualified
as a resident. Giving this instruction was error.

POINT III
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY
TRIAL.
In State of Utah v. Steele, Kane County Criminal No. 031600115, the
defendant made his initial appearance through counsel on April 7, 2004. Those
proceedings were dismissed on January 30, 2007, some 1028 days after the defendant's
appearance and without bringing him to trial. The State's motion to dismiss stated that
the dismissal was sought due to "lack of evidence to prosecute." R 34. In refiling the
charges, the State failed to identify any evidence which was purportedly developed
between the filing of the State's motion to dismiss and the refiling of charges. After the
charges were refilled, the defendant appeared through counsel on May 11, 2007.
The defendant moved the district court to dismiss the refilled case on the
grounds that the charges could not be pursued without violating the defendant's right to a

speedy trial. In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the district court embraced
the State's argument, finding:
Lack of evidence was simply cited as a convenient reason for
dismissing the case. The true reason was that both John
Hummel and Jim Scarth were later appointed to be Kane
County Attorneys creating conflicts of interest with their
former client the Defendant.
R 37. The court then concluded that this constituted "good cause" for dismissing and
refiling the charges and that the defendant was not prejudiced "because the refiling
occurred two months after dismissal." R 37-38. The district court failed to indicate why
the arising conflict of interest necessitated the dismissal of the prosecution that had been
initiated in 2003 in the first place. Any conflict of interest could have been resolved with
the substitution of counsel.
The defendant's trial began on February 24, 2009, some 655 days after his
appearance in the refiled case. Prior to commencement of the trial, the defendant again
moved the court to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds. R 99-101. That motion was also
denied. Even if the time intervening between the dismissal of the 2003 proceedings and
defendant's appearance in the 2007 proceedings is not counted, there was a 1683-day
delay in bringing the defendant to trial.
In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2187, 33 L.Ed.2d
101 (1972), the United States Supreme Court observed:
[T]he difference between the right to speedy trial and the
accused's other constitutional rights is that deprivation of the
right may work to the accused's advantage. Delay is not an
uncommon defense tactic. As the time between the
commission of the crime and trial lengthens, witnesses may
1n

become unavailable or their memories may fade. If the
witnesses support the prosecution, its case will be weakened,
sometimes seriously so. And it is the prosecution which
carries the burden of proof. Thus, unlike the right to counsel
or the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination,
deprivation of the right to speedy trial does not per se
prejudice the accused's ability to defend himself.
The Barker court further stated:
A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach
speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more
than identify some of the factors which courts should assess
in determining whether a particular defendant has been
deprived of his right. Though some might express them in
different ways, we identify four such factors: Length of
delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of
his right, and prejudice to the defendant.
A/, at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192.
Finally, the Court noted: "The length of the delay is to some extent a
triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial,
there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance." Id.
Emphasis added.
In State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court
concluded that the 42-day delay that elapsed between Trafny's arrest and the dismissal of
the charges against him did not rise to the level of per se prejudice, nor was it
presumptively prejudicial. Id. at 706. However, the court went on to concede that the
119-day period that elapsed between the refiling of the charges and Trafny's trial,
together with the initial 42-day delay, "[standing alone, . . . might at first blush seem
prejudicial

" Id. at 708 Accordingly, the court went on to consider the reasons for
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the delays. In so doing, the court noted that the delays were the result of the
unavailability of a witness and "Trafny's own motions or failure to request certain items
of discovery." Id. Citing State v. Mathis, 7 Utah 2d 100, 319 P.2d 134, 136 (1957), the
court concluded that the absence of necessary and vital witnesses was a valid reason for
delay by the State if the witnesses would be available within a reasonable time. Id. at
708, fn 14. The court further noted that delays caused by the defendant "will not be
counted against the State and will weigh against the defendant in considering the totality
of the circumstances." Id. at 708, fn 15. The court concluded that Trafry had not been
denied the right to a speedy trial.
If the 161-day delay in Trafny "might at first blush seem prejudicial," the
1683-day in the instant case certainly requires an examination of the reasons for the
delay.2 Instead of conducting such an examination, the district court simply concluded
that the defendant was not prejudiced "because the refiling occurred two months after
dismissal." R 37-38. The court was apparently under the impression that the length of
the delay was to be calculated by examining the time intervening between the dismissal
and the refiling of the charges. This was error.
Obviously, a delay of only two months does not rise to the level of per se
prejudice, nor is it presumptively prejudicial. Length of delay is the "triggering
mechanism" to the remainder of the Barker test. Therefore, even if the district court had

2

While State v. Trafny can be distinguished on the grounds that the defendant in the case
was incarcerated awaiting trial, the prejudice to one's ability to defend which is caused by
unreasonable delay is the same whether the defendant is free or incarcerated pending trial.
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conscientiously attempted to apply that test, the court would have conducted no further
analysis because the district court erroneously concluded that it was dealing with a delay
of only two months.
Moreover, the district court erred in concluding that the evolving conflict
of interest constituted "good cause" for dismissing and refiling the charges. Clearly, the
conflict of interest created by Kane County's hiring Jim Scarth could have been resolved
with a substitution of counsel and did not require a dismissal of the charges. The
dismissal of the 2003 proceedings served only to delay a resolution of the case and
further complicate matters.3
Generally speaking, an appellate court reviews a trial court's
determinations on speedy trial issues for abuse of discretion. State v. Coleman, 2001 UT
App 281, IP, 34 P.3d 790, cert, denied, 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002). However, the abuseof-discretion standard of review presupposes that the trial court correctly determined the
length of the delay in question. In the instant case, the district court clearly
misapprehended the length of the delay in question. Its exercise of discretion based upon
an erroneous premise cannot be sustained.

3

While not part of the record herein, it is noted that following the dismissal of the 2003
proceedings, the defendant had to sue Mr. Scarth to recover unearned attorney fees. See
Roger Steele vs. Jim Scarth, Kane County Case No. 088600003. In those proceedings, Mr.
Scarth defended on the grounds that the fees had been earned in full because "Jim R. Scarth
negotiated the dismissal of the criminal case which [Steele] refers to as the 'underlying'
case'' and "[p]ursuant to these negotiations, that criminal case against Mr. Steele was
dismissed." Scarth's Memorandum filed November 19, 2008, at page 2.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the defendant's
conviction of WANTON DESTRUCTION OF PROTECTED WILDLIFE must be
reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of October, 2009.

Gary W. Pendleton
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
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A P P E N D I X

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 23-20-4(1) (2003)

(1) A person is guilty of wanton destruction of protected
wildlife if that person:
(a) commits an act in violation of Section 23-13-4,
23-13-5, 23-13-13, 23-15-6 through 23-15-9, 23-16-5, or
Subsection 23-20-3(1);
(b) captures, injures, or destroys protected wildlife; and
(c) (i) does so with intentional, knowing, or reckless
conduct as defined in Section 76-2-103;
(ii) intentionally abandons protected wildlife or a carcass;
(iii) commits the offense at night with the use of a
weapon;
(iv) is under a court or division revocation of a license,
tag, permit, or certificate of registration; or
(v) acts for pecuniary gain.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 23-19-5 (2003)

It is unlawful for any person to obtain or attempt to obtain a
license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration by fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation. It is unlawful for a nonresident
to purchase a resident license. It is unlawful for a resident to
purchase a nonresident license. Any person violating the
provisions of this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

LAWS OF UTAH

2007, Ch. 136, § 3, amending UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-19-5 to read as

follows:
(1) It is unlawful for:
(a) any person to obtain or attempt to obtain a license,
permit, tag, or certificate of registration by fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation;
(b) a nonresident to purchase a resident license; and
(c) a resident to purchase a nonresident license.
(2) Any license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration
obtained in violation of Subsection (1) is invalid.
(3) Any person violating Subsection (1) is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor.
(4) A fraudulent claim of residency in another state or
country does not exempt a person from the definition of
resident in Section 23-13-2.

